Eurobonds that can work now!
A critique of the European Commission’s Green Paper on ‘Stability’ Bonds, by Stuart Holland published by Yanis Varoufakis,
…This (Stuart Holland’s) paper both critiques the Green Paper and proposes Twin Track approaches for Union Bonds to stabilise the crisis and Eurobonds to finance growth. It claims that this should be acceptable to Germany and other surplus Member States on the grounds that neither such proposal needs Joint Guarantees, Fiscal Transfers or Debt Buyouts, that a conversion of a share of national debt to the Union could be on an enhanced cooperation basis, and that Eurobonds for the recovery of growth would be funded not by German or other taxpayers but by inflows to the Union through their purchase by the central banks of emerging economies and sovereign wealth funds…..
Stuart concludes his critique thus..
..The Green Paper not only displaces the vital importance of growth, and fails to refer to the Delors White Paper whose aims resonated for more than a decade at the highest political level.
It also is recommending proposals which imply not only mutual guarantees and therefore potential fiscal transfers, but also Treaty revisions and new institutions.
In so doing it neglects to cite other proposals for bonds both to stabilise the crisis and to fund growth which could be effected without the need for Treaty revisions. These include “Twin Track” alternatives with Union Bonds for Stability and Eurobonds for growth.[7] This approach:
► does not imply joint guarantees, fiscal transfers – or a general buying out of national debt – to which Germany and other key Member States are opposed;
► recognises that this could be by an enhanced cooperation procedure which would not bind all member states and with the key political advantage that Germany and other member states could keep their own bonds;
► distinguishes Union Bonds for stability which would not be traded from Eurobonds for growth which would be traded and attract inflows from the central banks of emerging economies and sovereign wealth funds.
– Without Joint Guarantees, Fiscal Transfers or Debt Buyouts
The precedent that neither transfer of a share of national debt to the Union nor net issues of bonds need joint guarantees, fiscal transfers of debt buyouts is that of the European Investment Bank which has issued bonds without them for more than 50 years and has been so successful that it now is more than twice the size of the World Bank and the world’s largest multilateral development bank.
– By Enhanced Cooperation
The case for introducing Union Bonds for stability by enhanced cooperation by whichGermanyand other surplus member states could keep their own bonds has not been considered by the Commission Green Paper. But the precedent is strong in the introduction of the Euro itself which was a de facto case of enhanced cooperation.
The procedure for enhanced cooperation within the institutional framework of the EU requires nine member states. The voting procedure for enhanced cooperation depends only on the consent of the member states instigating it, not a qualified majority decision. [8]
– Union Bonds
On lines similar to the Bruegel proposal (Commission Green Paper Proposal 2) a conversion of national debt of up to 60% of GDP could be converted to Union Bonds for debt stabilisation by those member states consenting to them.
Unlike the Bruegel proposal, these need not be traded but could be held in a consolidated EU debit account. Such a debit account could not be used for credit creation any more than a credit can be drawn on a personal debit card.
Since the converted bonds would not be traded they would be protected against speculation by rating agencies. But they would not need fiscal transfers between member states. Member States whose debt is converted into Union Bonds would service their share of them.
The Bruegel Institute has proposed a new institution to hold the conversion of such a share of national debt to theUnion. But a new institution is not needed. The converted Union Bonds could be held by the European Financial Stability Faculty and, after it, by the ESM.
– Eurobonds
Eurobonds to finance recovery and growth would be traded and attract inflows to theUnionfrom the central banks of emerging economies and sovereign wealth funds. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africahave re-stated in September 2011 that they are interested in holding reserves in Euros in order to help stabilise the euro area.
Doing so by investing in Eurobonds rather than by national bonds both could strengthen the Eurozone and enable the BRICS to achieve their ambition of a more plural global reserve currency system.
– Not Counting on National Debt
Eurobonds would not count on national debt since they would be the bonds of theUnionrather than member states. An analogy is US Treasury Bonds which do not count on the debt of member states of the American Union such asCaliforniaorDelaware. They would not need member state guarantees anymore than do European Investment Bank bonds, while EIB bonds also do not cunt onMemberStatenational debt (see below).
– Union Bonds and the ECB or the EIF
Parallel proposals have suggested that the converted national debt should be held by the European Central Bank and net bond issues also managed by it.[9]
Alternatively eurobonds could be issued by the European Investment Fund which was set up by Delors to issue Union Bonds and now is part of the European Investment Bank Group. The EIF would gain from the EIB’s vast experience and expertise in bond issues while the ECB could back them withut any further backing from the member-states or anyone else. The case that net issues of Eurobonds (for financing growth rather than existing debt-conversion) should be by the EIF as part of the EIB Group also makes operational sense in that the EIB has decades of experience of net bond issues whereas the ECB has none.
– Growth
Growth would be enhanced since Eurobonds would co-finance EIB investment projects which are serviced by the revenues of the Member States benefiting from them, rather than fiscal transfers between Member States.
None of the major Eurozone Member States, nor Ireland, Portugal or Greece, count EIB project funding against their national debt, nor need any member state do so. The decision whether or not to do so is governmental and does not depend on a Treaty revision.
– Cohesion
Cohesion would be enhanced in that, since the Amsterdam Special Action Programme, the EIB already has a cohesion and convergence remit for investment projects in health, education, urban renewal, the environment and green technology, as well as financial support for small and medium firms and new high tech start-ups.
– Competitiveness
Competitiveness would be enhanced by a share of the net inflows into Eurobonds financing a European Venture Capital Fund for small and medium firms, or a European Mittelstandspolitik, which was one of the original aims of the European Investment Fund.[10]
– Maastricht Compliance
With a conversion of debt of up to 60% of GDP to Union Bonds all Member States other thanGreecewould beMaastrichtcompliant on their remaining national debt.Greecewould remain a special problem, since still well in excess of the 60%Maastrichtlimit but, as such, an exceptional case meriting continued debt buy outs.
– Stability and Growth Pact
The “Twin Track” strategy of Union Bonds for debt stabilisation and Eurobonds to finance growth also would give political and public credibility to the SGP where growth has been sacrificed to stability and would further be so by the proposals in the Commission Green Paper.
– Debt Restructuring and Reducing National Debt
None of the above is to the exclusion of debt restructuring in the sense of debt write downs. Nor does it deny the case for reducing national debt. But this could be phased over the medium to longer term in line with the “Twin Track” Strategy for combining stability through Union Bonds with growth through Eurobonds.
The case for reducing national debt through for growth has been demonstrated in the US case by the adoption of such a strategy by the Clintonadministration and that in each of the four years of its second term the federal budget was in surplus.[11]
Interesting. Stuart Holland is an insider with long experience. He worked with the original visionaries of the European Project as a very young economist. It does seem extraordinary that the current mandarins do not pay more attention to his prescriptions.
